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ABSTRACT
Children’s imitation is not random, but depends on the context of the demonstration and
imitation opportunity. For example, children are more likely to copy acts modeled by multiple
people versus a single individual. In this study, I investigate the mechanisms underlying this
phenomenon by manipulating the number of demonstrators and mode of presentation for a goaldirected task. Children saw either one or two adults demonstrate unnecessary target acts while
opening boxes to retrieve toys, and demonstrations were presented either live or on video.
Children imitated the target acts at equal rates across conditions. This may reflect children’s
heightened attention to reproducing the salient goal (i.e., opening the box to retrieve a toy) as
opposed to copying the acts used to achieve the goal. Future studies should manipulate children’s
prior experiences, goal salience, and the majority influence to determine the relative importance
of each of these factors in guiding social learning.
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1

INTRODUCTION

As children grow up, they are faced with the task of acquiring countless skills and
behaviors in order to become capable members of society. Some of a child’s learning occurs
through direct instruction, either in a formal setting (i.e., from a teacher in a classroom) or in
everyday life (i.e., from a parent at home), and from independent trial and error and explorative
play (Steinberg, Belsky, Meyer, 1991). Still, each of these learning strategies involves a fair
amount of conscious effort on the part of the child, and cannot wholly account for the rapid
achievement of skills. Scientists have additionally explained some of children’s development as
a product of observational learning (Berk, 1996). Instead of seeking out explicit learning
opportunities, children may encode and reproduce adults’ everyday actions. Indeed, even within
the early days of infancy, infants will reproduce facial gestures (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983) and by
one year of age they will spontaneously copy object-centered actions (Want & Harris, 2002).
The process of imitation has been extensively studied, including comparison of humans
and chimpanzees (e.g., Horner & Whiten, 2005; Tennie, Greve, Getscher, & Call, 2008) and is
experiencing a renewed interest in the literature. Specifically, researchers have a particular
interest in when and what children imitate. How do children know what is important to copy and
retain for future use, and how do they know what to ignore? The goal of the present study is to
examine how the context of the imitation opportunity (specifically, the number of demonstrators
a child sees and their mode of presentation), in combination with task features, affect imitation.
1.1

Faithful Imitation and Complex Culture
Children’s earliest imitation tends to involve copying primarily the physical outcomes of

others’ behaviors (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). During the second year of life, children
also begin to reproduce the specific acts a model uses to complete those goals (Nielsen, 2006;
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Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). For example, after seeing an adult use a rakelike tool retrieve a toy, children are likely to reproduce the exact means they saw (i.e., using an
edge or raking) to achieve the outcome of retrieving the toy (Nagell, Olguin, & Tomasello,
1993). Through early elementary school and even in adulthood, individuals imitate entire action
sequences, even when some actions are clearly and visibly unnecessary (e.g., McGuigan,
Whiten, Flynn, & Horner, 2007; Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2009).
Faithful imitation is present even in remote human populations. Nielsen and Tomaselli
(2010) found that Kalahari Bushman children imitated causally irrelevant actions at similar rates
to a typical Australian sample. The Kalahari are a group who do not engage in direct pedagogy
with children, and these results are taken to suggest that high imitative fidelity is not the result of
Western pedagogical emphasis. This suggests that the tendency to copy another’s exact means is
a ubiquitous human trait.
In contrast, nonhuman primates rarely copy the exact means an adult uses to produce
outcomes (e.g., Call, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005; Tennie, Greve, Getscher, & Call, 2010).
Comparative research has found that our closest evolutionary relatives, chimpanzees, ignore
faithful copying and instead use an emulative approach when sufficient causal knowledge is
made available (Horner & Whiten, 2003). This was found in direct contrast to the performance
of 3- and 4-year-old children, who more often adopted an imitative approach, regardless of the
availability of causal information. Similarly, even children as old as ten are found to copy the
means to an outcome exactly, even when it is not the most efficient strategy (DiYanni, Nini, &
Rheel, 2011). With this in mind, researchers have investigated faithful imitation to better
understand human learning and how it differs from that of other primate species.
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Some researchers have posited that imitating not only the outcomes of others’ behaviors,
but also the exact means used, serves an important function for the development of complex
culture. In particular, faithful imitation may allow for cultural “ratcheting” by allowing an
individual to take in everything that another person does and then make modifications to it
(Tomasello, 1999). This optimized method can then be passed on to others and modified further,
allowing for a methodological advancement along generations. Accordingly, faithful copying
and cultural ratcheting are two processes that appear to be unique to humans (Dean, Kendal,
Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012).
1.2

Factors Guiding Imitation
Although the ability to copy acts in precise detail may be useful, it is not always an

efficient strategy. Blindly copying everything observed would lead children’s behaviors to
become a jumble of mistakes and miscues. Instead, children also make use of a variety of
contextual cues and strategies to guide their imitation. For example, children pay attention to
intentionality when deciding what behaviors to imitate. When actions appear accidental, children
are less likely to copy modeled behaviors (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998). Children also
take into account situational constraints and the goal at hand. For example, when an adult
modeled turning on a light by pressing it with their forehead, children were only more likely to
imitate these exact means of turning on the light when the adult’s hands were not occupied
(Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002).
In addition, children are more likely to imitate adults’ exact behaviors as opposed to
those of their peers, even when the younger demonstrator explicitly states their competency
(Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). This bias of attributing expertise to older individuals may
represent one way that children avoid adopting inefficient or erroneous behaviors of their
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inexperienced peers. It is also possible that this adults-as-experts bias is a culturally embedded
learning strategy that is hard to extinguish, even with explicit task prompts. Although children
often copy faithfully, attention to these types of cues may guide children to adopt a rational
strategy where appropriate.
Another efficient learning strategy may be to copy what multiple individuals do. It makes
intuitive sense that children can circumvent adopting an individual’s idiosyncrasies by paying
attention to and reproducing the common behaviors of the many people they see. Recent research
has found that this is indeed the case; children are more likely to adopt the response of a majority
as opposed to that of an individual.
1.3

Majority-biased Transmission
To date, there have been two studies that have demonstrated that children are more likely

to adopt the behaviors of a majority than those of an individual. The first of these studies, by
Haun, Rekers, and Tomasello (2012), dubbed this phenomenon “majority-biased transmission”.
In their study, children watched either one or three adults drop a ball down a colored tube. There
were three different tubes to choose from, and the total number of demonstrations was equal
across conditions. When later given the opportunity to drop a ball down one of the tubes,
children were more likely to drop it down the same color tube as had been selected by the
majority, and not the response demonstrated by an individual multiple times. Chimpanzees’
responses also showed a pattern of majority-biased transmission, which suggests that this
response strategy is shared with our closest biological relatives.
Results from another recent study have provided evidence of increased imitation in
response to multiple individuals (Herrmann, Legare, Harris, & Whitehouse, 2013). In their study,
children watched video displays of either one or two adults demonstrating an action sequence of
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pushing and tapping on differently colored pegs using a mallet. The task was designed to
replicate performing a ritual, and as such it had no obvious physical goal, other than changing the
position of the pegs. Children’s imitation was scored by allocating one point for reproduction of
each part of the demonstration, with a maximum score of six points. They found that children
had significantly higher imitation scores after viewing two successive demonstrators, in
comparison to viewing one demonstrator model the action sequence twice.
1.4

Explanations for Majority-biased Transmission
There are several possible explanations for why children and chimpanzees choose to copy

what the majority of individuals do. Authors of the original findings of majority-biased
transmission posit that it is an efficient means for learning because the response of the majority is
likely to be “safer, more reliable, and more productive” (Haun, et al., 2012, p. 727). To put it
another way, the majority behavior represents an “expert” response that is potentially useful or
efficient. It makes sense that children would want to copy what most people do.
However, it is important to note that the task used in the original paper (dropping a ball
down a tube) is fairly simple, and does not produce an obvious physical reward or goal.
Therefore, it remains to be seen whether majority-biased transmission extends to more functional
or goal-directed acts. If children view the majority as a useful expert, then we would expect
children to imitate the majority behaviors in goal-directed tasks, where ‘doing it right’ is
important.
The more recent study of majority-biased transmission also uses a non-goal-directed task,
although this is because these authors approach majority-biased transmission from a different
perspective. Instead of focusing on the majority response as one that is ‘safer’ and ‘more
reliable’, Herrmann and colleagues (2013) suggested that copying the majority is how children
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learn social conventions and rituals. These are sequences of behaviors that often have no obvious
physical goal, and accordingly, their task includes an action sequence that produces no outcome
on the stimuli.
An unaddressed explanation for majority-biased transmission is that it is socially
motivated. Many researchers have explained faithful imitation as a mechanism by which social
affiliation is achieved. Notably proposed by Uzgiris (1981), imitation is not only an efficient way
to learn about the world, but can also be a way we establish affiliation and “likeness” with other
people. This idea remains very prevalent today, with many authors explaining the robustness of
faithful imitation as the result of an engrained social process that facilitates interactions between
people. In support of this proposal, recent studies show that manipulating the social context of a
task can affect children’s imitation. For example, children are more likely to copy irrelevant acts
leading to an outcome when the person who demonstrated the acts is present to watch (Nielsen &
Blank, 2011). This suggests that imitation is employed to achieve a perceived social benefit.
Another study varied the social responsiveness of demonstrators using both pre-recorded videos
and Skype, revealing higher imitation performance with the socially interactive model (Nielsen,
Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008).
Given that social context determines children’s faithful imitation, it is possible that
majority-biased transmission could be explained as a socially motivated process. Using multiple
demonstrators presents a heightened social pressure, or enhanced opportunity to affiliate via
imitation, which could increase children’s copying.
1.5

Current Study
The goal for the current study is to address the role of two explanations for majority-

biased transmission. First, in the current study I address the role of expertise by using explicitly
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goal-directed acts. Specifically, in this task, children interact with different types of boxes
containing toys. Before viewing demonstrations, children are given the opportunity to
manipulate the boxes and open them, which highlights the goal of the task – opening the boxes to
retrieve the toys. Allowing children to have a successful experience with the boxes prior to
demonstrations not only underscores the goal of retrieving the toy, but should prevent ceiling
levels of imitation across conditions.
After their initial experience with the boxes, children view either one or two adults
demonstrate opening the boxes while employing a causally irrelevant act (e.g., turning a switch
attached to the side of the box). Research has found that children imitate irrelevant acts even
when they recognize that the acts are unnecessary to achieving a goal (Lyons, Young, & Keil,
2007). Thus, we expect children to imitate in this task, despite their knowledge that the acts are
unnecessary. If majority-biased transmission occurs in goal-directed tasks, then children should
copy the irrelevant act more often after viewing two demonstrators, rather than one.
A second question addressed in the current study regards the extent to which majoritybiased transmission is a socially motivated phenomenon. Previous research has manipulated the
social context of an imitation task using live and video models (e.g., Nielsen, Simcock, &
Jenkins, 2008); in the current task, children see either live or videotaped demonstrations. If
majority-biased transmission is motivated by social affiliation via imitation, then it should only
occur in the live demonstration condition. However, it is possible that majority-biased
transmission is robust regardless of the affiliative opportunity, in which case it may also occur in
response to video demonstrations.
It is important to note that a large amount of research has found that children imitate less
following video demonstrations, in comparison to live ones. This is said to reflect a “video
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deficit effect” by which children learn substantially less from 2-D video displays in comparison
to 3-D, interactive live ones. (Anderson & Pempek, 2005; Barr, 2010). However, there are
several examples of imitation following video demonstrations in recent research literature (e.g
DiYanni, et al. 2011; McGuigan, et al., 2007; Wood, et al., 2012 Zmyj, et al., 2010). It has also
been shown that children are capable of learning from video by two years of age (Brito, et al.,
2012). It is still unclear whether majority-biased transmission can be induced following video
demonstrations. If social motivation plays only a limited role in majority-biased transmission, it
is possible that there will be equal levels of imitation in both the live and video conditions.
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2
2.1

METHOD

Participants
Forty three-year-olds (M = 37.1 months, SD = 2.7; 17 males) were recruited from the

Learning and Development Lab Subjects Database for this study. This database includes families
living in and around the city of Atlanta. In our sample, 55% of families self-identified as White,
27.5% as Black/African-American, and 15% as mixed race (one family did not report ethnicity).
In addition, 80% of families self-identified as Non-Hispanic/Latino and 15% as Hispanic/Latino
(two families did not specify).
2.2

Materials
Four types of boxes were used, and there were two boxes of each type. Each box

contained a unique, age-appropriate toy that fit easily within the box. Each box could be easily
opened with a simple manipulation (e.g., pulling a drawer out, lifting the top). There was also an
attachment on each box (e.g., a plastic or metal piece, a carrying handle) that was manipulated
during the adult demonstration (the target act). The manipulated attachments were superficial
and did not affect how the boxes opened. The boxes and the target acts associated with each are
detailed in Table 1.
In the video condition, children viewed demonstrations on a portable DVD player (11.5
cm x 20 cm).
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Table 1
Description of Materials

Box type

Target Act

Black Drawer

Turn side wheel switch
to make a clicking noise

Blue Knob Box

Squeeze metal piece
with thumb and
forefinger

Heart box

Swipe white plastic
piece with forefinger

Suitcase

Flip blue carrying
handle up and down

Photo
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2.3

Design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two modality conditions (live or video)

and all participants saw either one or two demonstrators; this created an experiment with a 2x2
mixed factors design. In the video condition, children viewed demonstrations by either one or
two adult models in video format. In the live condition, live adult demonstrators replaced the
videos. In both conditions, the demonstrators were unfamiliar to the child.
The presentation order of boxes and order of demonstrators was counterbalanced across
participants. Specifically, the first two demonstrations of each session always contained the same
number of models (one or two), and it switched for the second two demonstrations.
2.4

Procedure
There were four components of the task. The task was identical for each pair of boxes,

which produced four trials for comparison and analyses. The only differences between the live
and video conditions existed in part (3) of the task, which is the demonstration (see Figure 1).
The task for each set of boxes proceeded as follows:
(1) Introduction to boxes and toys. An adult experimenter sat across from the child at a small
table inside a laboratory testing room. The experimenter brought up the pair of boxes
from behind the table. The boxes were open and the toys were clearly visible. The
experimenter introduced each of the toys to the child. After the child had a chance to play
with each of the two toys, the toys were placed back inside the boxes and the
experimenter closed the boxes. This part of the procedure ensured that the children knew
what is inside the boxes, and that the boxes were identical. After the boxes were closed
with the toys inside, the experimenter took both boxes below the table and out of the
child’s sight.
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(2) Successful experience with first box. The experimenter brought up one of the boxes,
presented it to the child, and said something like, “Why don’t you try to open it?” The
child was then allowed to interact with the box. Children almost always opened the boxes
easily without further direct instruction. After the child opened the box, the experimenter
removed it from view by placing it back under the table.
(3) Demonstration. In the video condition, the experimenter brought up a DVD player and
placed it on the table. The experimenter directed the child’s attention by saying
something like “Let’s see what they do in the video”. The video demonstrators were male
and female.
In the live condition, the two adult demonstrators stayed in the room throughout
the task, in addition to the experimenter who directed the task. The demonstrators did not
interact with the child aside from providing the demonstrations, which were identical to
those presented in the video. A male and female were not always available to
demonstrate; in some cases, two females demonstrated.
The target acts were modeled on both boxes in each set. In the single
demonstrator condition, the adult demonstrated the target act twice (once on each box). In
the two demonstrator condition, each demonstrator modeled the target act once. This
controlled for the total number of demonstrations per condition. The boxes and toys used
in the video were the same ones used in the test room.
(4) Imitation opportunity. After viewing each demonstration including the target actions, the
child was presented with the second box (i.e., the box he/she had not already opened).
The experimenter said something like, “Why don’t you try to open this one?” The child
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was allowed to interact with each box until he/she has successfully opened it or he/she
lost interest in the task.

Figure 1. Photographic description of task progression.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Scoring
Children’s imitation performance was scored with a yes/no (1/0) judgment in regards to

their production of the target act (one per object). Children’s performance of the target act was
scored on both the first and second boxes. Performance on the first box of each set provides a
baseline measure of how often children spontaneously execute the target act, whereas
performance on the second box represents a standard measure of imitation. The first dependent
measure is children’s imitation score (sum of target act completions during imitation
opportunity; range 0 to 4, or 0 to 2 for each set of demonstrators). Difference scores were
calculated by subtracting the total number of target acts completed on the first boxes (children’s
baseline rate of producing the target acts) from imitation scores (range -4 to 4). Difference scores
can be compared to zero to assess children’s learning of the target act from pre-demonstration to
post-demonstration.
To address the possibility that children paid more attention when viewing one modality
versus the other, a randomly selected 27.5% of subjects (n = 11) were coded on how long they
spent looking at the demonstrations. Research assistants who were blind to the research
hypothesis scored from video the times at which children looked to and from the live and video
demonstrations, to the video frame. There are 30 video frames per second.
To assess reliability, imitation scores were recoded for a randomly selected 30% of
subjects (n = 12), ICC(1,9) = .89.
3.2

Preliminary Analyses
A preliminary analysis using a 2(participant gender) x 4(counterbalancing order) x

4(object) repeated measures ANOVA revealed no significant interactions of these variables.
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There were no effects of gender or counterbalancing order; therefore, we collapsed across these
groups for analyses.
The percent of the total demonstration time spent looking at the displays did not differ
between subjects in the live (M = 98.6%, SD = 2.25) and video conditions (M = 96.5%, SD =
3.27), t(9) = 1.26, p = .239. Percent of time spent looking also did not differ between viewing
one demonstrator (M = 96.1%, SD = 4.97) or two demonstrators (M = 99.1%, SD = 2.14), t(10) =
1.87, p = .09.
3.3
3.3.1

Main Analyses
Imitation Scores
A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was used to investigate the effects of number of

demonstrators and demonstration modality on imitation scores (see Figure 2). There was neither
a main effect of number of demonstrators, F(1,38) = 0, or demonstration modality, F(1,38) =
.087, p = .77, on imitation scores. Additionally, there was no interaction of number of
demonstrators and demonstration modality on imitation scores, F(1,38) = 1.03, p = .32.
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2

Imitation Score

1.5

1
0.8

0.85

0.7

0.65

Live
Video

0.5

0
One
Two
Number of Demonstrators

Figure 2. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) by number of demonstrators and demonstration
modality.

It is possible that children’s behavior changed across trials. To account for this
possibility, we separately analyzed imitation scores in the first two and second two trials with
two 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVAs. In these analyses, number of demonstrators was a
between-subjects variable. In the first two trials, there was neither a main effect of number of
demonstrators, F(1, 36) = .112, p = .74, or demonstration modality, F(1,36) = .062, p = .74, on
imitation scores. There was also no interaction of these variables, F(1,36) = .020, p = .89 (see
Figure 3). Although the pattern of imitation scores in the later trials is somewhat different (see
Figure 4), again, there were no significant main effects of demonstrators (F(1,36) = .124, p =
.73) or modality (F(1,36) = .077, p = .78) and no significant interaction (F(1,36) = 1.35, p = .25).
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2

Imitation Score

1.5

1

0.9

0.8

0.82

0.78

Live
Video

0.5

0
One
Two
Number of Demonstrators

Figure 3. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) in the first two trials by number of demonstrators and
demonstration modality.

2

Imitation Score

1.5

1
0.8

0.82

Live
Video

0.5

0.6
0.44

0
One
Two
Number of Demonstrators

Figure 4. Mean imitation scores (+/- SEM) in the second two trials by number of demonstrators
and demonstration modality.
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3.3.2

Difference Scores
To assess whether seeing the demonstration affected children’s production of the target

acts, we examined difference scores in both the live and video conditions using one-sample ttests. Difference scores from children in the live condition (M = 1.00; SD = 0.97) were
significantly greater than zero, t(19) = 4.60, p < .001, indicating imitation. The same was true for
children in the video condition (M = 0.85; SD = 1.14), t(19) = 3.34, p = .003.
We also ran the same 2 x 2 ANOVAs as we did in the previous section, except we
replaced imitation scores with difference scores as the dependent variable. The pattern of the
results was similar to what was found with imitation scores. There were no significant main
effects of number of demonstrators, F(1,38) = 1.41, p = .24; demonstration modality, F(1,38) =
.201, p = .66; or interaction between these variables, F(1,38) = .156, p = .70.
3.3.3

Children with Unsuccessful First Experience
Some children (n = 15) were unable to get the first box open on some of the trials. We re-

ran the main analyses with these unsuccessful trials removed to account for the possibility that a
prior unsuccessful experience could affect imitation. There were no significant differences in
these analyses compared to the original results.
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4

DISCUSSION

Children showed evidence of imitating the target acts. Difference scores in both the live
and video conditions were significantly greater than zero. This finding is encouraging because it
shows that children did learn from both live and video of displays of one and two demonstrators.
However, the current results show no effect of either of the experimental manipulations. For one,
imitation was not affected by the number of demonstrators (one or two) viewed. Thus, I did not
find evidence of majority-biased transmission. Second, children in the live condition did not
imitate more than those in the video condition. This suggests a limited role of social motivation
driving imitation on this task.
There are several possible explanations for why the experimental manipulations did not
produce significant differences in the current study. It is important to note that the current task is
similar in many ways to previous tasks that have elicited the expected effects. For one, past
studies have found increased imitation after children viewed video displays of two demonstrators
in comparison to one demonstrator acting twice (Herrmann, et al., 2013). The age range tested
here (three years) also fits within the range of ages where majority-biased transmission has been
previously found (two to four years). Previous work has manipulated the social context of
imitation by using live versus video displays, with results of increased imitation in response to
live models in the room (Nielsen & Blank, 2011; Nielsen, Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Lastly,
this type of imitation task has produced variable levels of imitation across experimental
manipulations in prior studies (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markman, 2008).
With these points in mind, in the next sections I evaluate explanations for majority-biased
transmission, present hypotheses of why null results were obtained, and outline potential future
studies that could clarify these issues.
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4.1

The Majority as an Expert Response
The goal of this study was to evaluate different possible underlying causes of majority-

biased transmission. The original authors documenting this effect proposed that it is a
mechanism by which individuals learn “safer, more reliable, and more productive” behaviors
(Haun, et al., 2012, p. 727). Taken a step further, individuals may view the majority response as
an expert response. There is sufficient evidence showing that perceptions of expertise, in general,
guide children’s faithful imitation (e.g., Wood, et al., 2012). However, in the present goaldirected task, children showed no evidence of imitating the majority at higher rates than in
response to an individual. These null results support the possibility that children do not view the
majority response as an expert response. This strong interpretation of these findings would
suggest that the effect of majority-biased transmission found in past studies is due to other
factors, such as the social situation within the tasks.
Before drawing this strong conclusion, however, an alternate explanation must be
considered: children may view the majority response as an expert response but do not make use
of this expertise in the current imitation paradigm.
4.1.1

The Effect of Prior Experience on Imitating the Majority
One feature of the current task that may have influenced children’s imitation of the

majority response is that participants were allowed to complete the overall goal of the task (i.e.,
opening the box to retrieve a toy) prior to viewing the demonstrations. This part of the procedure
was included because it allowed measurement of children’s initial rates of target act production
and also to ensure the goal was salient to them. However, these initial experiences also provided
children an efficient response for the task. This may have overridden children’s consideration of
other contextual factors in imitation (e.g., number of demonstrators or demonstration modality),
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which could explain why there were no differences. A logical next step in this line of research is
to remove the initial successful experience and investigate whether majority-biased transmission
can occur with the same materials and design.
Data collection for this project has already begun. So far, I have tested both three- and
four-year-olds using the same method, but have removed the initial successful experience of
opening the boxes. Although data collection is still in progress, there is trend toward majoritybiased transmission, with greater imitation scores after viewing two demonstrators compared to
one demonstrator. Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that children value their own
experiences more highly than a model’s example when executing functional acts on objects, even
when they see multiple models.
4.1.2

The Effect of Goals on Imitating the Majority
Another element that may affect children’s use of the expertise of the majority is that this

was a goal-directed task. My hypothesis was that having a goal should emphasize the importance
of expertise. However, it is possible that this type of task, instead, de-emphasized the importance
of the specific acts or means leading to that goal. Some research has found that children imitate
with higher fidelity when there is no obvious physical goal at hand (e.g., Bekkering,
Wohlschläger, & Gattis, 2000; Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Williamson & Markman,
2006). In contrast, when acts have a clear goal, children may be more likely to disregard the
adult’s exact actions in favor of producing the physical outcome. Thus, the goal in the current
task may have made the manipulation of the number of demonstrators less effective for the
peripheral target act.
One way to address the role of a physical goal within the design of the current task would
be to remove the goal of retrieving the toy. The design of this modified task would be identical to
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what was used here, with the exception that there would be no toys inside the boxes. The
demonstrations would then consist of the adult(s) manipulating parts of the box, but producing
no physical change in the end-state of the task. The child’s attention may then shift more to
production of the target act, and majority-biased transmission could be elicited.
4.2

The Role of Social Motivation in Response to a Majority
An alternative hypothesis we proposed to explain majority-biased transmission is that it is

the result of social pressure, instead of a perception of expertise. Previous research has found that
children’s imitation is enhanced by having demonstrators present to see their acts copied
(Nielsen & Blank, 2011) and when the model is socially responsive (Nielsen, Simcock, &
Jenkins, 2008), but in the present study, the presence of live demonstrators did not increase
imitation. Given that the current results seem to contradict prior findings, it is difficult to assess
the hypothesis of whether or not majority-biased transmission is socially motivated. It remains
possible that majority-biased transmission reflects some social underpinnings, but was not
induced with the live and video manipulations used here. However, I can conclude that having
two demonstrators present to watch the child imitate is not sufficient, in itself, to elicit majoritybiased transmission.
It seems intuitive that I could better investigate the social influence of the majority by
using more than two demonstrators. One important consideration in manipulating of the number
of actors is to delineate majority-biased transmission versus conformist transmission. Past
research has shown that adults conform to others’ responses, even when they have strong reason
to believe that the majority is wrong (e.g., Asch, 1956), and more recent work has revealed
similar effects in four-year-olds (Haun & Tomasello, 2011). These studies have explained
conformity as a result of social pressure, whereas the current findings provide at least some
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evidence against the possibility that majority-biased transmission is entirely social. Future work
may aim to clarify the (potentially different) mechanisms that underlie these two processes.
4.3

Conclusions
Many past studies of children’s imitation have varied only a single factor, such as the

salience of a physical goal, a model’s expertise, or the presence of a social partner. Results from
these studies have revealed a number of factors that affect children’s imitation. Although the
current study was designed to vary only two of these features, namely, the mode of presentation
and the number of demonstrators, the null results complicated matters.
In order to explain these results in the context of previous studies, it was necessary to
evaluate several factors that may have influenced imitation. Taking together the current and
previous findings, one can begin to examine how multiple factors interact in children’s imitation.
Although future work is certainly needed, it seems from the current results that task goal and
prior experience may have been most important, whereas the presence of multiple demonstrators
was less influential.
Understanding the relative importance of the different factors that guide imitation will
help us to explain exactly why and when children copy others’ actions. This information could
give us a better idea of how children learn, and could inform how we teach children using
demonstrative cues. Although the current study does not conclusively answer these questions, it
provides a motivation for future work investigating how various task features interact and affect
imitation.
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